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In some applied areas of psychology—
particularly engineering psychology,
human factors psychology, and related
areas—a common underlying assumption
is that it is inevitable that people will seize
upon useful new technologies and exploit
them with dispatch, though some have
suggested more complex points of view
(Davis, 1993). In turn, useful technolo-
gies transform human societies (Woolgar,
2009). It is easy to provide examples that
confirm this assumption. Furthermore, it
is difficult to list counterexamples, which
serves to further fix the assumption in the
minds of those researchers who are at the
intersection of humans and technology.
There is a good reason why it is difficult
to list counterexamples. Consider that for
us to agree that a technology is useful at
the larger level of the whole society (rather
than just specialized uses that have little
impact on the larger society), that tech-
nology needs to be demonstrated to have
been used at a societal level or else there
is no way for us to know that it is, in fact,
useful at that level. Obviously, if the tech-
nology has been used successfully—again,
this is a prerequisite for us to know that it
is useful—it would seem to be a tautology
that the technology has been used success-
fully! Is there a way out of the tautology? Is
there a way to test, independently, whether
a technology is useful and whether it has
been used?
A consideration of history suggests a
possible way out. An advantage of studying
the history of different cultures is that they
can serve as naturally occurring “control”
conditions for each other. For example,
historians credit two technological innova-
tions with being responsible for much of
the history of Western Civilization. One of
these is the popularization of the stirrup
in the medieval centuries in Europe, which
significantly altered mounted warfare by
greatly reducing the likelihood of a rider
falling off of his horse while fighting,
increasing the force and variety with
which mounted riders could strike blows,
increasing the efficacy of shock tactics, and
others. Some authorities have even gone
so far as to credit the stirrup with being
largely responsible for the advent of feu-
dalism (e.g., White, 1962):
“Few inventions have been so simple as
the stirrup, but few have had so catalytic
an influence on history. The require-
ments of the newmode of warfare which
it made possible found expression in a
new form of western European society
dominated by an aristocracy of warriors
endowed with land so that they might
fight in a new and highly specialized
way” (p. 38).
Another example is the popularization of
guns and gunpowder during the late mid-
dle age and renaissance in Europe. The
military uses and effects on history are too
well known to necessitate further elabora-
tion here. There can be little doubt that the
stirrup and gunpowder both had an enor-
mous influence on the history of Western
Civilization.
Thus far, the stirrup and gunpow-
der seem to be excellent examples of
humans exploiting advances in technol-
ogy. But the picture changes substantially
if we switch our focus to the history of
China, whose societies failed to exploit
these technologies at a level commensu-
rate with European exploitation. The his-
torian, Dreyer (2002), both acknowledged
the importance of the stirrup and gun-
powder in Europe while denying equal
importance in China:
“China’s long history of technological
progress provides scant comfort for the-
ories that see certain kinds of social and
political change as the inevitable result
of specific technologies. Neither the stir-
rup nor gunpowder had the dramatic
consequences in China claimed for them
in Europe” (pp. 28–29).
It is important to be clear that Dreyer was
not claiming that the Chinese did not have
the stirrup or gunpowder because they did,
and earlier than the Europeans had them.
Nor was Dreyer claiming that the Chinese
made no use whatsoever of these technolo-
gies. Rather, Dreyer’s point is that the tech-
nologies did not have the transformative
effects that historians have pointed to in
the history of Western Civilization. There
are many arguments that can be made to
explain this difference between West and
East, but for my purpose, the mere histori-
cal fact of the difference between West and
East is sufficient.
So how do the examples of the stir-
rup and gunpowder enable researchers
to circumvent the foregoing tautology?
The answer is that both technologies
were proven to be extremely useful and
exploitable in the West. Nevertheless, their
effects on society in the East were greatly
attenuated. What happened in the West
gives independent evidence of the poten-
tial utility of the technologies whereas
their relative lack of use in the East
demonstrates that it is not the case that
people will necessarily rush to use tech-
nologies that are new and useful. Put
another way, the stirrup and gunpow-
der provide two devastating examples
from history that contradict the typical
assumption made by applied researchers
at the intersection of psychology and
technology that the advent of new and
useful technologies inevitably leads to
their widespread exploitation and asso-
ciated societal transformations (Davis,
1993).
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A possible counter to my argument
might be that the stirrup and gunpowder
were useful in theWest and not in the East,
and for that reason were adopted in the
former but not in the latter area. However,
the historical record indicates otherwise.
The Mongols went through China like a
hot knife through butter under their great
leader Genghis Khan, and they were aided
greatly by the fact that they had stirrups
(De Hartog, 1989). In large part it was
the stirrup that enabled them to conquer
China and eventually establish the Yuan
dynasty. This is strong evidence that stir-
rups were important in the East, or at
least would have been if people had rec-
ognized the possibilities, but the histor-
ical fact of the matter is that they were
way behind the West in exploiting the
technology.
The same is true of gunpowder.
Although the East was far behind
the West in developing the potential-
ities of the technology, once they saw
it, they did adopt it (Lococo, 2002).
During the transition period, some
of the Chinese hired Western cannon
experts, and thereby had an impor-
tant advantage against Chinese who did
not do that. So the potential impor-
tance of gunpowder eventually became
obvious even in the East, particu-
larly during the Qing dynasty (Lococo,
2002).
In summary, stirrups and gunpowder
would have been extremely important in
the East, as well as in the West, if only the
people in the East had seen (and devel-
oped) the possible ways to exploit the tech-
nologies as people in the West did. But
the historical fact is that they did not.
This is not because these ways of exploit-
ing the technologies were unimportant in
the East, relative to the West, but rather
because people just did not see them.
Possibly, this is because of cultural prej-
udices. In China, many saw no reason to
change the eternal “Kingdom of Heaven”
and in Japan, the Samurai resisted the
switch to gunnery (Perrin, 1979; Dreyer,
2002). Thus, we see that societies do not
always adopt useful technologies. This is
not necessarily due to the technologies
being potentially more important in one
culture than in another, but rather that
cultures themselves can blind people to
possibilities as well as make people aware
of possibilities.
In conclusion, the examples of the stir-
rup and gunpowder show that it is a fallacy
to automatically assume that useful new
technologies will be exploited in a timely
fashion. They also illustrate the value of
psychologists looking beyond the psychol-
ogy literature, which is biased in a Western
direction, to consider what has been dis-
covered by researchers in other social sci-
ences, such as history.
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